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Explanatory Indispensability
Arguments in Metaethics and
Philosophy of Mathematics
Debbie Roberts
My aim in this chapter is to defend explanatory indispensability arguments for
the existence of irreducibly evaluative properties from what I call the super-
venience objection. A structurally similar argument and objection are found in
the philosophy of mathematics. My strategy is to argue that a response to the
supervenience objection is available that is structurally similar to a recent
response made in the philosophy of mathematics case. My claim is that reductive
realists in metaethics, like nominalists in philosophy of mathematics, have to take
what has been called the ‘hard road’. And in metaethics, like in philosophy of
mathematics, we have good reasons to think that this road is not navigable.
I proceed as follows: Section 10.1 deals with some preliminary background
issues. In Section 10.2 I outline the structure of explanatory indispensability
arguments in general before giving some cases from metaethics and philosophy
of mathematics. In this section I also make some remarks about good explanations
and consider and respond to a proto-version of the supervenience objection. I then
turn, in Section 10.3, to the supervenience objection itself, and the structurally
similar objection in philosophy of mathematics, which I call the nominalist
objection. In Section 10.4 I give my response to the supervenience objection,
drawing on a recent responseMark Colyvan has made to the nominalist objection.
10.1 Preliminary Issues
10.1.1 Causal v. non-causal explanations
Historically, it has mostly been naturalist realists who have made appeals to
explanatory considerations in metaethical arguments for realism. Moreover,
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these realists have tended to argue that the relevant sort of explanation is causal:
moral properties are causally efficacious (or causally relevant) and thus suited to
scientific explanation and admissible into our ontology.1 Much of the debate has
involved responses to Gilbert Harman’s claim that moral properties fail to pass
an explanatory indispensability test, understood as a test for causal efficacy,
where passing this test is necessary for inclusion in our ontology.2
Although my focus is on explanation, I am going to depart from the line
pursued by naturalist realists in two ways. First, my focus will be evaluative
explanation more generally, of which I take moral explanation to be a subset.
Second, I am going to be using explanatory considerations to defend a brand of
non-reductive realism that resembles in some respects what others have been
happy to call non-naturalism.3 This will strike some as immediately extremely
controversial, and perhaps dubious, because historically non-naturalist realists
have not used explanatory indispensability arguments precisely because the
relevant sort of explanation was assumed to be causal and non-natural properties
are commonly thought to be causally inefficacious. However (and these are
further ways in which my argument departs from that pursued by naturalist
realists) I am going to bracket the issue of whether the relevant sort of explan-
ation here is causal and the explanatory indispensability argument I am con-
cerned to defend is not intended as a direct response to Harman’s challenge.4
These last two points are connected, and require some further discussion.
Dialectically speaking, the discussion in this chapter is not best viewed as a
continuation of the moral explanation debate started by Harman. Harman’s
challenge concerns a necessary condition, best interpreted as the claim that an
entity or property in question must be causally efficacious to be granted onto-
logical legitimacy.5 The argument that I am concerned to defend, on the other
hand, takes explanatory indispensability to be a sufficient condition for onto-
logical legitimacy. Moreover, as I said above, I also wish to bracket the issue of
whether the relevant sort of explanation is causal. One might think that
1 For example, Sturgeon (1986), Brink (1989), Majors (2003). Nelson (2006) makes use of
Jackson and Pettit’s (1990) notion of program explanation in defending the causal relevance of
moral properties.
2 Harman (1977). See also his (1986) and (1998).
3 I put the point in this way because I think the natural/non-natural distinction is problematic.
See Dancy (2006 p. 122) and Vayrynen (2009 }3).
4 I take it that Sturgeon (1992) and Railton (1998) successfully show that the final version of
Harman’s challenge, that moral theories face a confirmation problem, is at odds with Harman’s own
moral theory.
5 See Majors (2007) for a useful overview of the literature in this debate, and a discussion of how
the debate concerns particularly the causal-explanatory role of moral properties.
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bracketing whether the relevant sort of explanation is causal is a bit of a cheat.
I do acknowledge that the question of what kind of explanation this is supposed
to be, and why it is ontologically committing, is an important one. For this
reason, some of what I say in the later sections is intended to address this issue.
But there are a few reasons why it is legitimate to officially bracket this issue here.
For one thing, the objection that I am responding to already grants that the
relevant explanations are the best ones. Whether these explanations are causal, or
must be causal to be the best, is not at issue. For another, the view that
explanations must be causal to be appropriately ontologically committing is no
longer as widely accepted.6
10.1.2 Appeals to analogies with philosophy of mathematics
Many prominent non-reductive realists in metaethics are what Sarah McGrath
has recently called ‘relaxed realists’.7 They hold that whilst moral properties are
not causally efficacious, and thus do not pass Harman’s explanatory indispens-
ability test, it is a mistake to think that moral properties are thereby metaphys-
ically or epistemically problematic. These realists often appeal to an analogy with
mathematical properties to defend their view, where the strategy is one of
companions in innocence: roughly the line is that mathematical properties are
not causally efficacious, but we are not worried about their metaphysical status or
our epistemic access to them, so we should not worry about moral properties in
these ways either.8
I agree with McGrath that non-reductive realists ought not to be relaxed, and
ought to be facing head on what look to be metaphysical and epistemic problems
for their view.9 And, like McGrath, I think that appeal to the analogy with
mathematical properties is in some respects problematic. Platonists in philoso-
phy of mathematics tend not to be relaxed realists at all, but to work very hard to
defend the metaphysical and epistemic respectability of mathematical properties.
6 See, for example, Rosen (2010), Lange (2009), Woodward (2003), Strevens (2008), Skow (2013).
That the mathematical explanations that I discuss below are not causal but yet are ontologically
committing is explicitly accepted by Platonists. And indeed, Platonists make the point that to insist
that the explanations be causal to be ontologically committing is to beg the question in this context.
It seems at least possible that the explanations in the evaluative case could be noncausal but yet
ontologically committing. I leave this issue open though, for even if it turns out that the explanations
are causal in the evaluative case this does not, in my view, rule out non-naturalism. See, for example,
Wedgwood (2007 pp. 192–9).
7 McGrath (2014 pp. 186–7).
8 See, for example, Parfit (2011), Scanlon (2014). McGrath’s main focus is Dworkin (2011).
9 See, for example, Enoch (2011) particularly chapters 6 and 7. Enoch is suspicious of explanatory
indispensability arguments for robust (non-reductive, non-naturalist) moral realism however,
though he does not spell out his reasons for this suspicion in detail (2011 p. 53).
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At the end of her paper, McGrath expresses a hope that the moral realist will be
able to find support for her views in the example of mathematics. One of the
respects that she suggests this might be possible concerns explanation. In this
chapter my aim is to show that McGrath is correct about this: careful scrutiny of
Platonist work in this area can indeed support moral realism, and robust, non-
reductive moral realism at that.
10.2 Explanatory Indispensability Arguments
The general form of the argument that I am interested in defending is as follows:
(1) A property E or entity M is genuine if reference to that property or entity
figures ineliminably in the best explanation of some phenomenon P.10
(2) Reference to E/M is indispensable to the best explanation of P.11
Hence
(3) E/M is a genuine property/entity.
E is an irreducibly evaluative property and M a mathematical entity.
10.2.1 Metaethics
Consider the following cases:
Donald is rude. Suppose that Donald behaves rudely. He shouts ‘This is utter
rubbish’, loudly, in the middle of a visiting speaker’s talk. The other members
of the audience become embarrassed and annoyed with Donald.12 What
explains the audience’s embarrassment and annoyance? Plausibly, Donald
being rude.
Growth of political protest movements. The growth of political protest move-
ments and social instability is to be explained by the injustice of the society.13
The cowardly rescuer. The fact that the leader of the rescue expedition was vain
and cowardly explains the incompetence of that expedition, and thus the
numbers of people that perished.14
10 I take it that this is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for genuineness.
11 For ease of phrasing, I’m here assuming that reference without referents is possible. But
nothing hangs on this, and the premise could be phrased to eliminate talk of reference.
12 Adapted from Harman & Thomson (1996 pp. 81–3) cited in Wedgwood (2007 p. 194).
13 This example is common in the literature on moral explanation. An early statement can be
found in Brink (1989 pp. 190–4) cited in Sinclair (2011 p. 2).
14 Sturgeon (1985 p. 63).
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Systematic lack of self-esteem. Widespread lack of self-esteem in members of
certain groups in a society can be explained by degrading (for example, racist
or sexist) socio-political structures that systematically undermine the per-
ceived worth of members of these groups.15
Many more examples of this sort could be given. Such cases can figure in
explanatory indispensability arguments for non-reductive realism in metaethics.
These arguments claim that the moral or evaluative property (more precisely,
reference to such a property) is indispensible to the best explanation of the
phenomena to be explained, and that this commits us to the existence of
irreducibly evaluative properties.16
10.2.2 Philosophy of mathematics
In order to see why current work on explanatory indispensability arguments in
philosophy of mathematics may be helpful to metaethicists, it will be useful to
first fill in some background before looking at examples of such arguments in
more detail.
Historically, the most influential indispensability argument in the philosophy
of mathematics is the Quine–Putman Indispensability Argument which can be
represented as follows:
(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the posited
entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(P2) Mathematical posits are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
Hence
(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
This argument is not specifically an explanatory indispensability argument.
Exactly what mathematical posits are indispensable for will depend on the
criteria for good scientific theories. Explanatory power will be only one of
those; unificatory power and simplicity may be others. As it stands, ‘indispens-
able for science’ could allow mathematical posits into the ontological fold without
those posits having to do any explanatory work at all. Moreover, Quinean holism,
understood as the picture of science as a web of interconnected theories evaluated
15 See, for example, Rawls (1971 part III) and Dillon (1997).
16 In the cases above, I use thick concepts and properties as examples of evaluative concepts and
properties. This is not uncontroversial, but for the purposes of this chapter I am going to assume that
thick concepts and properties are inherently evaluative.
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as a single whole by balancing the criteria for good scientific theories, makes it
even easier for Platonists: if the best web contains mathematical posits, then the
entities posited are indispensable for science no matter where in the web those
posits appear.
We might worry that this makes things too easy, that a posit merely appear-
ing somewhere in a web of scientific theories is not sufficient to warrant
ontological commitment to the entities referred to by that posit. Those who
feel the force of this worry think that since inference to the best explanation is
the major generator of ontological commitment within scientific realism, the
way to make things tougher here is to require that mathematic posits must be
indispensable for explanatory purposes. Moreover, to avoid mathematical
entities riding in on the coat-tails of the entities actually doing the real explana-
tory work, Platonists have lately come to argue for the existence of mathemat-
ical entities by focusing on their indispensability in individual explanations of
specific phenomena.17
On the face of it, though, there are certain affinities between Platonism in
philosophy of mathematics and non-reductive realism of the sort that I am
interested in defending—both claim the existence of entities or properties that
are held to be metaphysically queer and epistemically inaccessible in similar sorts
of ways. A potentially fruitful way for the non-reductive realist to proceed then is
to explore this more recent work on explanatory indispensability in philosophy of
mathematics. Here are two examples of such arguments:
Periodical Cicadas. The best explanation of why periodical cicadas have the
life-cycle periods that they do is that prime periods are evolutionarily advan-
tageous. This is because having a life-cycle period that minimizes intersection
with other (nearby/lower) periods is evolutionarily advantageous.18
Throwing Sticks. Suppose that you throw some sticks into the air with a lot of
spin, so that they separate and tumble about as they fall. Freeze the scene at
some point during the sticks’ descent. Why are more of them near the
horizontal axis than near the vertical rather than in more or less equal numbers
at each orientation? The best explanation of this fact appeals to geometric facts.
Roughly speaking, there are many more ways for a stick to be near the
horizontal than near the vertical.19
17 See, for example, Baker (2005). 18 Baker (2005 p. 233).
19 Lipton (1991 pp. 33–4) cited in McGrath (2014 pp. 190–1).
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10.2.3 Good explanations
At this point, it is helpful to note the following about good explanations.20 Good
explanations have explanatory power. This involves at least two things. The first is
the capacity to discriminate. A good explanation must discriminate between
all the features present in a case, picking out only some, the ones that plausibly
do the explanatory work. The second is a capacity to generalize. Whatever
features are picked out as doing the explanatory work, these must be ones that
will also do the same explanatory work across a range of relevantly similar
situations. These two features are connected. If the explanation has the capacity
to generalize across the relevant range of situations, that increases the plausibility
that the explanation discriminates in the right sort of way, that is, by picking out
those features that actually do the explanatory work.
For (reference to) a property or entity to be indispensable to a good explan-
ation is for it to be the case that it could not be eliminated from the explanation
without making that explanation worse. Explanations are made worse if they are
made to lack the capacities to generalize and to discriminate. To illustrate these
points, consider the following.
In principle, it might be possible to come up with an explanation in the
throwing sticks case that makes no reference to geometric facts but only to the
physical forces that each stick is subject to. This explanation discriminates as it
picks out only some features of the case, namely the physical forces that each stick
is subject to. It is plausible that the physical forces explain in this case since
conjoining all of the physical explanations for each individual stick would result
in a sufficient condition for the sticks being in the position that they are when the
scene is frozen.
However, this explanation has no capacity to generalize in the appropriate
way, and this undermines the plausibility that this explanation discriminates in
the appropriate way. Consider that if we were to vary certain elements of the case,
for example, the position of your hands when you released the sticks, the force
with which you threw them into the air, the precise amount of spin, and the
precise point at which the scene is frozen, it would still be the case that more of
the sticks would end up near the horizontal axis than near the vertical at the point
at which the scene is frozen. Intuitively, these are elements of the case that are not
essential to the explanandum. However, the long conjunction of physical
20 Note that my aim is not to give a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for good
explanations. I pick on only two features here which are plausibly both necessary. This is not
meant as an exhaustive account of good explanations.
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explanations for the movement of each stick in the original case would not be able
to explain the position of the sticks in any of these new cases.21 This means that
the long conjunction fails to generalize across the relevant range of situations.
By contrast, the explanation that makes reference to geometric facts both
discriminates and has the capacity to generalize: this explanation can explain
the original case, and any of the subsequent cases generated by varying any or all
of the non-essential elements of the explanandum. This increases the plausibility
of the claim that this explanation discriminates in the appropriate way, that is,
that the right facts are being picked out as explanatory.
Accordingly, reference to geometric facts could not be eliminated from the
explanation in the throwing sticks case without making for a worse explanation.
Since we are licensed to accept into our ontology entities the reference to which is
indispensible to the best explanation of specific phenomena, we are licensed to
accept the existence of geometric facts.22
Return now to the evaluative cases:
Donald is rude. Suppose that Donald behaves rudely. He shouts ‘This is utter
rubbish’ in the middle of a visiting speaker’s talk. The other members of the
audience become embarrassed and annoyed with Donald. What explains the
audience’s embarrassment and annoyance? Plausibly, Donald being rude.
Growth of political protest movements. The growth of political protest move-
ments and social instability is to be explained by the injustice of the society.
The cowardly rescuer. The fact that the leader of the rescue expedition was vain
and cowardly explains the incompetence of that expedition, and thus the
numbers of people that perished.
Systematic lack of self-esteem. Widespread lack of self-esteem in members of
certain groups in a society can be explained by unjust (for example, racist or
sexist) socio-political structures that systematically undermine the perceived
or felt worth of members of these groups.
Using such cases, non-reductive realists in metaethics can argue for ontological
commitment to irreducibly evaluative properties, if it is the case that reference to
the irreducibly evaluative property could not be removed without making the
explanation worse.
One immediate stumbling block for the non-reductive realist concerns the
supervenience of the evaluative on the non-evaluative. Explanatory indispensability
21 See also McGrath (2014 pp. 190–1).
22 For a detailed and persuasive argument for the claim that the cicada case gives us a genuine
mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon see Baker (2005).
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arguments for irreducibly evaluative properties seem open to the objection that in
each case it is not the evaluative property that does the genuine explanatory work,
but the underlying non-evaluative properties. In the rudeness case, one might
object, it is not rudeness that explains the audience’s embarrassment and annoy-
ance, but the non-evaluative properties of Donald’s action.
However, given the multiple realizability of evaluative properties, this proto-
supervenience objection fails. And it fails for the same reason that the physical
forces explanation in the throwing sticks case fails, namely that replacing refer-
ence to rudeness with Donald’s actions non-evaluatively described fails to gen-
eralize in the appropriate sort of way. We could vary certain elements (for
example, the precise words Donald uttered, replacing his words with gestures)
and get the same result, namely that the audience is embarrassed and annoyed.
‘That Donald was rude’ is explanatory in these new cases, whereas the non-
evaluative description of Donald’s action in the first case would not be.23
There is, however, a more pressing supervenience objection which might be
levelled against the non-reductivist. This objection is analogous to one that
certain nominalists have made in philosophy of mathematics.
10.3 The Objection
The general form of the objection I am here concerned to respond to is as follows:
(2) Reference to E/M is indispensible to the best explanation of P.
(4) Even if reference to E/M is indispensable to the best explanation of P, this
does not generate ontological commitment to E/M.24
I will call the objection as it arises in metaethics the supervenience objection and
as it arises in philosophy of mathematics the nominalist objection. There are of
course a number of objections that can be made to explanatory indispensability
arguments, both in general and to the particular version I am interested in
defending. My aim here is limited to defending explanatory indispensability
arguments for the existence of irreducibly evaluative properties from the super-
venience objection.
But there is another possible objection worth mentioning at this point, for it
might mistakenly be conflated with the supervenience objection. In response to
23 Wedgwood defends a similar response (2007 pp. 193–7). Reductivists may deny the multiple
realizability of evaluative properties. I consider this response in Section 10.4.2.
24 (4) is of course the negation of (1).
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the above cases, it may be claimed that reductive analyses of thick concepts and
the terms that express them are available. To take the cowardly rescuer case, such
a response would claim that ‘cowardice’ can be reduced to a certain evaluatively
neutral character trait (a certain attitude to fear, say) to which is attached a
negative evaluation. Those tempted by such reductive accounts will go on to
claim that what does the explanatory work in the cowardly rescuer case is the
evaluatively neutral character trait, and not the attached negative evaluation. Call
this the reductive analysis objection.
This reductive analysis objection is a different objection from the superveni-
ence objection for it denies what the supervenience objection accepts, namely
that evaluative terms are indispensible to the best explanations of some phenom-
ena. According to the reductive analysis objection, we can replace reference to
cowardice in the cowardly rescuer case with reference to the relevant evaluatively
neutrally specified character trait, and incur no explanatory loss.
In my view, reductive analyses of thick concepts and the terms that express
them are not available. However, given the aim of this chapter, this is not
something that I will argue for here.25
Before I outline the supervenience objection in more detail, it is helpful to
examine the nominalist objection in the philosophy of mathematics.
10.3.1 Philosophy of mathematics: the nominalist objection
In opposition to Platonists, nominalists in the philosophy of mathematics deny
the existence of mind-independent, abstract mathematical objects. They thus
deny that explanatory indispensability arguments like the ones referred to in
Section 10.2 succeed in establishing the ontological credentials of mathematical
entities. In response to these arguments, some nominalists pursue the kind of
strategy outlined in the objection above. That is, these nominalists argue for (4):
that even if mathematical terms are indispensable to the best explanation of some
specific phenomenon, this does not generate ontological commitment to math-
ematical entities.26
25 One might, however, take the view that reductive analyses of thick terms and concepts are not
available but that nonetheless a reductive account of the thick property is available. On this view,
thick terms—but not thick properties—would be indispensible to the best explanations of some
phenomena. The response I offer in this chapter will be directed against such views insofar as they
make use of supervenience in providing the reduction of the thick property.
26 This claim, or something very close to it, is endorsed by all those who wish to remain scientific
realists and to retain commitment to electrons and other theoretical entities, and who accept that
mathematics has an essential role to play in science. See, for example, Azzouni (2004), Leng (2010),
(2012), Melia (2000), Yablo (1998) cited in Colyvan (2010).
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To use Mark Colyvan’s terminology these are nominalists who think there is
an ‘easy road’ to nominalism, as opposed to the ‘hard road’ attempted by Field.27
The hard road to nominalism in philosophy of mathematics is that which
requires the nominalizing empirical science. This approach denies (2). Denying
(2) requires showing that our best scientific theories can be rewritten without any
of the mathematics. This is widely acknowledged to be an extremely difficult
task.28 Because of this, nominalists have been tempted down the easier road of
defending (4).29
These nominalists recognize the immense value of mathematics in formulating
scientific theories. Indeed, they are happy to say that mathematics plays an
indispensable descriptive/representational/expressive/accessing role—it is the
only way we have to describe/represent/express/access the nominalistic content
of empirical science. However, they argue, such indispensability fails to generate
ontological commitment to mathematical entities. In Joseph Melia’s terms,
mathematics in science is necessary only to make certain things sayable about
concrete objects; mathematical entities do not actually exist though, for math-
ematized theory is simply a way of representing the non-mathematical world.30
In Mary Leng’s terms, mathematical posits are fictions playing an indispensable
representational/descriptive role, but fictions nonetheless.31
10.3.2 Metaethics: the supervenience objection
It might seem that the proponent of the explanatory indispensability in me-
taethics is even more vulnerable to this kind of objection than the Platonist.
Many, if not all, metaethicists—including non-reductive realists—endorse a
global supervenience thesis along the following lines:
For all worlds w and w*, if w and w* are exactly alike non-evaluatively then they are
exactly alike evaluatively.32
This supervenience claim can be used to generate the analogous objection. This
version of the objection makes use of Jackson’s supervenience argument for his
analytical descriptivism.33 This argument is as follows.
27 Colyvan (2010). 28 See Burgess and Rosen (1997) cited in Colyvan (2010).
29 Colyvan (2010 pp. 285–6). 30 Melia (2000 p. 455). 31 Leng (2012 p. 2).
32 Exactly how this thesis should be formulated is a contentious issue. In particular, whether the
base properties should be characterized as ‘non-evaluative’ or ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ is a matter of
controversy. In my view this formulation is the least controversial. See Roberts (2011).
33 Jackson (1998 Ch. 5). Jackson himself doesn’t use his supervenience argument to make this
objection to the explanatory indispensability argument.
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Start from the representative evaluative predicate E ‘is a rude action’ together
with an action that satisfies that predicate. There will be a complete, non-
evaluative, description of that action and the world in which it occurs, given by
an enormous descriptive predicate D1. Given the supervenience thesis, D1 entails
E. But E doesn’t entail D1, for there may be other, different actions, characterized
non-evaluatively, that also count as rude. However, each of the actions-in-worlds
which satisfy E—there is a possibly infinite number of these—will have a non-
evaluative description; D2, D3, D4 . . . .Dn. The disjunction of all these non-
evaluative descriptions is D*. Now E entails D* but D* also entails E. Indeed,
E is necessarily equivalent to D*. Jackson claims then that since necessarily
equivalent predicates pick out the same property, we ought to conclude that
E picks out the non-evaluative property picked out by D*.34
We can run this same argument for any evaluative predicate. However, as
Jackson notes, it does not follow from the necessary equivalence of E and D* that
ethical vocabulary is dispensable in practice. Since D* is an enormous, potentially
infinite disjunction, we will still need to use evaluative predicates.35 Indeed, we
can say that our evaluative predicates will be an incredibly useful, even indis-
pensable, way of describing/representing/expressing/accessing the underlying
non-evaluative features. However, given the supervenience argument, despite
the indispensability of ethical terms, we can conclude that there is nothing
more there in the world, there are no extra features over and above the non-
evaluative features.
This argument can be used to generate the supervenience objection, analogous
to the nominalist objection outlined above. To reiterate, these objections grant
that the relevant terms can be explanatorily indispensible, but deny that this
generates ontological commitment to the entities or properties in question.36
According to the supervenience objection, evaluative predicates like ‘is a rude
action’ are merely a distinctive way of representing a purely non-evaluative
realm. Even if the evaluative predicate figures indispensably in the best explan-
ation of some phenomenon, what it picks out in the world, given supervenience,
34 Jackson (1998 pp. 122–4). 35 Jackson (1998 p. 124).
36 One potential disanalogy here. Mathematical nominalists typically take it that since there are
no mathematical entities to which mathematical terms refer, the application of such terms typically
results in false claims, literally interpreted. Their point is that this is no bar to such terms being
explanatorily indispensible (they are useful fictions). The proponent of the supervenience objection
in metaethics, however, grants that applications of moral terms can state truths. Their point is that
these truths can be reduced truths about non-evaluative properties. But crucially for the current
argument, both views condone the use of the disputed terms and allow that this use can be
indispensible in explanatory contexts whilst denying that such use incurs the relevant ontological
commitment.
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is a non-evaluative property (D*). We ought to conclude that explanatory
indispensability does not generate ontological commitment to irreducibly evalu-
ative properties.
10.4 Reply
The general strategy of my reply I borrow from one recently pursued by Mark
Colyvan against easy-road nominalists.37 This strategy is to argue that the easy
road is not available. More specifically, this is to argue that claim (4) is not
defensible. This means that those who want to avoid ontological commitment to
the properties or entities under discussion cannot claim (2). In other words, they
have to take the hard road of demonstrating how the relevant terms can be
dispensed without explanatory loss.
The nominalists in philosophy of mathematics I discuss here are scientific
realists who accept inference to the best explanation (IBE) as a generator of
ontological commitments. Likewise, I take the reductive realists who are my
opponents here not to dispute the legitimacy of IBE in general. This point is
important to the argument below.
10.4.1 Philosophy of mathematics: the content challenge
Colyvan’s response to easy-road nominalists is as follows: Since easy-road nom-
inalists are scientific realists, and not sceptical of IBE in general, an independently
motivated account is needed of why we do not get ontological commitment from
mathematical explanatory indispensability arguments. However, claims Colyvan,
this independently motivated account of why some cases of indispensability are
ontologically committing and some are not is not to be found. Instead, what we
find is that the accounts given trade on nominalist intuitions that mathematical
entities have no ontologically committing role to play. This is really no more than
a hunch that total theory will in fact tell us that mathematical entities are not
required. To make good on this hunch, Colyvan concludes, those who would do
without admitting mathematical entities to our ontology have to show that
mathematics is in fact dispensable to science. In other words, they have to
embark down Field’s hard road, a road widely regarded as highly unlikely to
lead to success.
As an illustration of the above, consider Joseph Melia’s ‘weasel nominalism’,
the strategy of retracting what you have previously said.38 Melia argues, contra
Putnam, that it is not inconsistent or intellectually dishonest to quantify over
37 Colyvan (2010). 38 Melia (2000).
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mathematical objects yet deny the existence of such objects. He points out that
often we say things that are contradictory only on an uncharitable understanding,
such as ‘All Fs are Gs except b’. This is not a contradiction but a weasely
retraction. Charitably, we should understand this as ‘all Fs except b are G’.
Similarly, Melia argues, when a nominalist says something like ‘the life cycles
of periodical cicadas are always prime but there are no primes’ we ought not to
understand this as contradictory. Just as we are allowed to add details to the story
about the world that were omitted earlier, so we should be allowed to take back
details that were included earlier. Moreover, sometimes, says Melia, the only way
we can say what we want to say is by weaselling.39 The use of mathematical talk in
science is a case in point. This shouldn’t concern us, however, because weaselling
is a legitimate strategy.
We can grant for the sake of argument that weaselling is sometimes a legitimate
strategy. However, it cannot always be legitimate, of course.40 We can change the
story we are telling by adding or subtracting minor details, but we cannot be
thought to be telling a consistent story or any story at all if we retract too much.
As Colyvan points out, Tolkien could not, late in the Lord of the Rings trilogy,
take back all mention of hobbits, for they are too central to the story. If he were to
do this we would be correct in demanding a paraphrase of the hobbitless story so
far, for without this we would be lost as to what the story was supposed to be. We
lose a grip on what is being said if too much is retracted.
The crucial question is what counts as too much? The answer seems to depend
on the availability of a suitable paraphrase. In the example given above, the
appearance of contradiction is merely that only because there is a paraphrase
available that explains this appearance away: all Fs, except b, are Gs. Consider,
though, cases of sentences where there is no available non-obvious paraphrase, let
alone an obvious one, and where those sentences are indispensable to the story
we are telling. Given that there is no background wholesale rejection of explana-
tory indispensability arguments, what reason is there for weaselling and not
taking the relevant sentences to be ontologically committing? The thought
must be that it is really something else, not primeness, that is doing the explana-
tory work. The only ‘reason’ in the vicinity then, argues Colyvan, is an appeal to
prior nominalist intuitions and sympathies—a hunch that there are not really any
mathematical entities in the world which could be doing any explanatory work.
Now, obviously, such a move begs the question against the Platonist. It is true
that non-existent entities cannot enter into true explanations, but we have not yet
39 Melia (2000 pp. 468–70).
40 My discussion of Melia’s argument follows Colyvan (2010 pp. 294–7).
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been given any reason to think that these entities are non-existent. Dialectically
speaking, what is really required at this point is that the nominalist provide the
paraphrase which explains away the apparent contradiction generated by weasel-
ling. Colyvan’s challenge is this: what is the nominalistic content that such
sentences describe/access/express/represent? This content challenge is the chal-
lenge of giving up the easy road and embarking down the hard road of nomin-
alizing science. And this road is widely regarded as extremely difficult, likely
impossible, to navigate.
10.4.2 Metaethics: the reduction challenge
Return now to the supervenience objection. The non-reductivist can pursue
Colyvan’s line, and ask for the independently motivated account of why good
evaluative explanations are not ontologically committing. In the end, I think,
such an account is not forthcoming here either, though the appeal to super-
venience means that we must go through more steps to see why this is so.
Take the Donald case above. Suppose the reductive realist says that what best
explains the audience’s embarrassment and annoyance is that Donald was rude,
but rudeness, the irreducible evaluative property, does not exist; there is no such
property doing the genuinely explanatory work. The non-reductivist may now
make the request for the independently motivated account of why no ontological
commitment to rudeness is generated in this case, despite the indispensability of
the term ‘rude’. In answer to this request, the reductivist can appeal to global
supervenience, which the non-reductivist accepts.
In this, metaethical case, unlike in the mathematical case, it seems as though
there is available an in principle way to effect the paraphrase: making use of the
global supervenience thesis, the supervenience argument tells us of the necessary
presence of D*. It is this—possibly infinite—disjunction of the underlying non-
evaluative descriptions of rude actions-in-worlds that is doing the genuine
explanatory work, the reductivist can claim. Given the sheer size and complex-
ity of D* providing the paraphrase is likely not going to be possible for an
ordinary human mind. However, it is open to the reductivist to reply that,
unlike in the mathematical case, we have something that guarantees that there
will be such a translation. Moreover, the reductivist can say, the possibility in
principle of such a translation is all we need to defend the plausibility of the
claim that terms can be indispensible to explanations without generating
ontological commitments to the entities they purport to refer to.
However, it merely appears that the evaluative reductivist is in a better position
than the mathematical nominalist. Remember that good explanations must have
both the capacity to discriminate and the capacity to generalize. The complexity
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(but in principle availability) of D*, is what is supposed to answer the question of
why it is legitimate to claim that evaluative terms can be indispensible to
explanations without generating ontological commitment to irreducibly evalu-
ative entities. But it is not at all plausible that D* explains anything, for D* fails to
discriminate, and it thus fails to generalize in the appropriate way.
Why does it not generalize in the appropriate way? Consider what D* is: a
potentially infinite disjunction where each disjunct is a complete non-evaluative
description of an action and the entire world in which it is situated. It is true that
wherever we have a rude action we will have D* because one of the disjuncts of
D* will be instantiated. In that sense there is a guarantee, and D* will apply across
a range of different situations. But this guarantee is in no sense explanatory, and
thus what generalizes is not the explanation. This guarantee is not explanatory for
most of what each disjunct of D* contains is irrelevant. Each disjunct of D* fails
to discriminate between those features that are doing explanatory work and those
that are not.41 Citing D* as explanatory in this case would be like citing as
explanatory a potentially infinite disjunction of complete physical descriptions
of actions in entire worlds in the throwing sticks case. This would fail to even pick
out the physical forces each stick is subject to as especially explanatorily relevant.
Analogous to the situation of the easy-road nominalist, then, it turns out that
the reductivist cannot claim that although evaluative terms are indispensible to
the best explanations of certain phenomena this in no way commits us to the
existence of irreducibly evaluative properties. And this remains so even though in
the metaethical case there is available the appeal to the global supervenience
thesis which is accepted on both sides. Given the dialectical situation, the burden
of proof is on the reductivist to provide the account of which of the non-evaluative
features in each disjunct of D* are explanatory.Moreover, the reductivist also has
to ensure that the explanations provided generalize appropriately.
In other words, what the reductivist has to do is actually provide the reductive
account.
It may seem at this point as if the road the reductivist has to take in metaethics
is not as hard as the analogous road that the nominalist has to take in philosophy
of mathematics. The reductivist can appeal to an argument Jackson, Smith, and
Petit level against particularism in ethics.42 Their argument is semantic and
proceeds as follows:
41 Dancy (2004) makes a related point, in objecting to Jackson’s argument, concerning right-
makers and the right-making relation.
42 Jackson, Petit, and Smith (2000).
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We use words to mark divisions in the world, tables are different from chairs, and rude
acts are different from tactful ones. What marks rude acts off from tactful acts must be
something that all the rude acts have in common. Grasp of the predicate ‘is a rude action’
simply consists in grasping the various disjuncts of D*. But that can’t be all that unites the
class of rude actions. There must be some commonality or pattern that we cotton on to
and that allows projection from some sub-set of the disjuncts of D* to new members. If
there weren’t such a commonality then we finite creatures could not have grasped the
predicate ‘is a rude action’.
The reductivist can go on to claim that this commonality is what is explanatory in
the Donald case. It is this feature, or set of features, that does the explanatory
work and, what’s more, this generalizes appropriately across the relevant range of
cases where rude actions cause embarrassment and annoyance.
The trouble with this argument is that it relies on an appeal to prior
reductivist intuitions and sympathies. Jackson, Pettit, and Smith assume that
the commonality will be a set of non-evaluative features.43 But this assumption
is in no way warranted. For the commonality or pattern need not be non-
evaluative. The commonality may obtain only at the evaluative level. Apart
from some antecedent commitment to reductivism, why should we accept that
the commonality doing the genuine explanatory work in the evaluative case
exists at the non-evaluative level? If the commonality exists only at the evalu-
ative level, then the only explanation available here which has the appropriate
capacity to generalize will be the one that makes reference to the evaluative
property. To put it in McDowell’s terms, the aspect of the world which prompts
the value judgment may not be, even in principle, recognizable as the aspect it
is independently of evaluation.44
The upshot of this is that the supervenience objection to the evaluative
indispensability argument fails. Just as it is not legitimate for the nominalist to
allow the explanatory indispensability of mathematical terms whilst denying that
this generates ontological commitment to mathematical entities, so it is not
legitimate for the reductive realist to allow the explanatory indispensability of
evaluative terms whilst denying ontological commitment to irreducibly evalu-
ative properties. The mathematical nominalist must provide the mathematics-
free translation of mathematical explanations in science, without explanatory
loss, and the reductivist must make the evaluative distinctions in the world in
non-evaluative terms, without explanatory loss.
43 This is to deny the multiple realizability of evaluative properties.
44 McDowell (1998 pp. 201–2).
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I have already mentioned that the road facing the nominalist is widely
regarded as so difficult as to be impassable. What reasons do we have to think
that the road for the evaluative reductivist will be similarly difficult? That the
reductivist must make the evaluative divisions in the world in non-evaluative
terms can be understood as a request for a complete mapping of evaluative
features on to non-evaluative features: ‘If objects have natural features N then
they have evaluative features E’, ‘If objects have natural features N* then they
have evaluative features E*’, and so on.45 What this is, on one influential way of
thinking about normative ethical theories, is a request for the true normative
ethical theory. And apart from some antecedent commitment to reductivism,
why should we think that this is possible?
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